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ABSTRACT
State of the Art Botnet-Centric Honeynet Design. (May 2009)
John Syers III, B.S., University of Houston–Downtown
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Udo W. Pooch
The problem of malware has escalated at a rate that security professionals and
researchers have been unable to deal with. Attackers savage the information technol-
ogy (IT) infrastructure of corporations and governments with impunity. Of particular
significance is the rise of botnets within the past ten years. In response, honeypots
and honeynets were developed to gain critical intelligence on attackers and ultimately
to neutralize their threats. Unfortunately, the malware community has adapted, and
strategies used in the early half of the decade have diminished significantly in their
effectiveness. This thesis explores the design characteristics necessary to create a
honeynet capable of reversing the current trend and defeating botnet countermea-
sures. This thesis finds that anti-virtual machine detection techniques along with
appropriate failsafes are essential to analyze modern botnet binaries.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The problem of security is relatively new, but it has grown at an exponential rate.
It has been just over twenty years since the Morris Worm was unleashed on an un-
suspecting Internet community. At that time, the worm was unprecedented, and the
idea that someone would intentionally unleash such a devastating program was un-
thinkable. At a certain point malware became commonplace. It is expected, indeed,
it is inevitable. Ironically, for the common user, malware has become less disruptive,
yet at the same time much more malevolent.
Malicious programs have developed at a rate greater than the security community
can keep pace with. What can be done? The answer to this question, like the related
field of information assurance, is broad, and could not possibly be answered in a single
paper. Instead, my goal is to focus on a specific subset of malware, namely botnets,
and analyze current security tools, focusing on honeynets, in order to develop a viable
countermeasure.
A. Botnets–The Killer Web App
In 2007 Syngress released a book called “Botnets: The Killer Web App.”[56] This
title faithfully captures the essence of the rise of botnets. Much like email did in
the previous decade, botnets have made a tremendous impact on the World Wide
Web. The major difference is, while email is a highly visible application, botnets
for all practical intents and purposes are invisible. This next step in the malware
evolutionary scale is distinctly different from its predecessors in that botnet writers
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2take great pains to keep the presence of this malware masked. And for the most part,
they have been successful.
How bad is it? The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) placed cybercrime
as their third highest priority, behind terrorism and corporate espionage [29]. They
instituted operation BOT ROAST in 2005. By 2007, the FBI reported that it had
identified over one million botnet infected computers in the United States [18]. In-
terestingly enough, botmasters found a way to use the FBI to actually further their
goals. Instead of using trite social engineering email subjects like ”I love you,” a re-
cent malware push involved emails titled, ”FBI may strike Facebook.” [48] The power
of the FBI and the popularity of Facebook made a powerful recruiting tool for the
Storm Worm/Botnet.
A 2007 report to Congress on Cybercrime reveals that the U.S. lost $62.7 billion
to cybercrime in 2005. Furthermore, it was reported that terrorists have the ability
to conduct cyberattacks that could harm the nation’s critical infrastructure, shutting
down power plants and disrupting air traffic control [70].
The report to congress goes on to cite a particular example of damage caused by
a botnet. A California man operated a botnet from 2004 to 2005. During this time
the botnet performed more than 2 million infections. Victims of the botnet included
hundreds of Department of Defense (DOD) computers in military installations both
in the United States and in our installations overseas. Fortunately, this individual
was apprehended, but one of the distinct problems of the botnet problem is that the
number of botnet operators that are operating unhindered are unknown.
What defenses do we have today against this threat? (Specifically, the threat of
having one’s systems become part of a botnet. There is also the threat of being at-
tacked by a botnet, but this is a different, and arguably harder problem.) The average
consumer has the standard anti-virus programs and internet security suites, but these
3programs are limited in their protective capability. Table I shows a portion of the
November 2008 Retrospective/ProActive anti-virus test from AV-Comparatives [3].
Major anti-virus programs were tested in November against malware samples that
were collected by AV-Comparatives three months prior. The program that demon-
strated the best performance only detected 71% of the malware, while McAfee VirusS-
can+, produced by the second largest anti-virus company in the world, detected a
dismal 37%.
Table I. November 2008 AV-Comparatives Retrospective/ProActive Test
Anti-virus programs are only effective against known botnet infections. A recent
article in Information Week illustrated the weaknesses in typical anti-virus programs.
In the article a sysadmin discovered an infection on a university computer. The com-
puter was called in and disinfected, but as soon as the machine was placed back on the
network, was discovered that the botnet infection remained [30]. The administrator
possessed the tools to detect anomalous activity on the network, but not the tools to
excise the malware from the infected machine.
4Botnets for which no signature has been released can function with impunity. The
Storm worm/botnet was discovered more than two years ago, at its apex boasted over
one million bots and showed no signs of abating [20]. It was rumored to be capable
of disrupting small countries [22]. Fortunately, this botnet was crippled mostly due
to a patch from Microsoft and was abandoned in September of 2008, though some
claim it was divided and sold [63][39]. What resources does the system administrator
have? Intrusion Detection Systems, for one, but the host-based systems are unpopular
because they create a significant drain on performance, and network-based systems
are subject to limitations similar to those of anti-virus programs.
B. Objective
The primary objective of my research is to develop a design for a honeynet capable
of dealing decisively with the current botnet threat. More specifically, my objective
is to
• Review the most effective characteristics of the latest botnets
• Determine necessary honeynet requirements based on botnet anti-honeypot
techniques
• Create a botnet design architecture based on these requirements
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BOTNET EVOLUTION
A botnet is one of the newer variants of malware. The botnet shares many charac-
teristics with other forms of malware, often spreading from device to device on the
Internet through various sources, including email and the web. What distinguishes a
botnet from other forms of malware is that instead of solely executing a pre-defined
set of instructions, a bot is also designed to accept instructions remotely from an
individual, who is referred to as a botmaster or botherder. As the bot program prop-
agates throughout the internet, the collective group of bots form a botnet, providing
the botmaster with an arbitrary number of machines to do his bidding.
A. Botnet History
The botnet finds its origins in Internet Relay Chat (IRC), which was created in 1988
at the University of Finland [51][53][45]. The creation of bots, which is short for
robots, followed shortly after. The first known bot was written by Bill Wisner and
called Bartender [37]. Its sole function was to serve drinks to channel users. A short
time later Greg Lindahl created an IRC game manager that allowed users to play
Hunt the Wumpus on a channel [38]. These simple programs paved the way for IRC
operators to write programs to perform simple functions, such as keeping channels
open. Bots grew in scope to the point where the bots were the de facto operators of
IRC; all administrative tasks were run through them.
In 1999, the first malicious IRC bot was discovered: PrettyPark. This was a
worm that installed its own IRC client to a system upon infection. Once installed,
the IRC client contacted an IRC server, and was capable of initiating file transfers of
privileged data, such as passwords and credit card numbers [21].
6The next year, a new IRC-related malware program was released, the Global
Threat (GT) bot. This bot was based on the newly updated mIRC [1], a still-
popular IRC client. mIRC had been endowed with a powerful scripting language that,
combined with socket capability, made a target for hackers. As the name implies, the
GT Bot included a set of commands geared toward conducting attacks. It was capable
of conducting Denial of Service (DoS) attacks using the Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) [45], User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [49], as well as Smurf and
Shiver attacks [6]. The GT Bot was not self-propagating, however.
In 2002, the SDBot surfaced. This bot combined the attack threat capability of
the GT Bot with the self-propagating characteristic of PrettyPark. Unlike the hacked
GT Bot, SDBot was an original work, written in C++ [6]. Another of its distinctive
characteristics was the fact it was a single, trim 40k executable.
SDBot was followed by Agobot. Because code from SDBot was made widely
available, it is believed that Agobot borrowed liberally from SDBot’s code [56]. This
bot was given a three-part modular design, and was made to be easy both to utilize
and to update. The Agobot code base is the code upon which the majority of today’s
botnets are based [6].
As malware has progressed from a method of demonstrating one’s superior hack-
ing skills or showing proof of concept to the means of illicit gain or other more sinister
clandestine activities, the botnet has emerged as the tool of choice. Botmasters sell
their services to the highest bidder, offering the ability to deliver spam, harvest confi-
dential information, provide web hosting, all for the right price. Malware development
is also a lucrative business, with price tags on botnets ranging into thousands of dol-
lars [6].
Even more disturbing is the fact that botnet activities are not limited to simple
money making ventures. With the use of the DoS, botnets can be used to attack
7organizations, and extort them. These attacks have even moved into the political
arena. In 2008, the Russian-Georgian conflict was characterized not only by Russian
tanks, but also by DoS attacks against Georgian government networks [24].
B. Basic Botnet Characteristics and Capabilities
Classifying botnets is a non-trivial task. A traditional hierarchical taxonomy is in-
sufficient for the task because there are several categories of defining characteristics
which overlap and are constantly changing. The initial starting point for the classifi-
cation comes from [26], which outlines the botnet infection process as a sequence of
five transactions that may be observed and subsequently used as a means of detection.
Conceptually, however, there are other defining characteristics of botnets that must
be included, subsequently what follows bears only a small resemblance to the dialog
flow approach of [26].
1. Propagation
Methods of propagation are closely related to the different forms of malware, therefore
some formal definitions are necessary. A virus is a malware program that, like a
biological virus, is dependent upon the ’life’ of a host in order to reproduce. Computer
viruses do not exist and function independently, rather they attach themselves to
other executable programs, and are run when those programs are run. A worm is
not dependent upon a host program in order to replicate. It may or may not be
self-propagating; methods of worm propagation will be discussed shortly. A trojan
horse or trojan is a program that appears to perform a certain benign function,
but surreptitiously perform certain malicious activities upon execution. Regrettably,
there are certain forms of malware that display characteristics of more than one of
8these forms, making them hard to classify. These may be referred to as hybrids. To
further add to the confusion, because viruses were the first and most well known form
of malware, the term virus is sometimes used generically to refer to malware. That
said, none of the botnets studied used the classical virus method for propagation, nor
is this expected to change.
Another issue that deserves mention is the role of social engineering in propa-
gation. The term social engineering itself is merely a buzzword meaning deception,
and most forms of malware–botnets included–employ deceiving the user as a means
of gaining entrance to their system.
a. Worms
Methods of worm propagation fall into two broad categories. The first are worms that
are capable of total self-propagation. This means that the worm requires no direct
assistance from the computer user in order to spread. Generally, these worms perform
network scans for hosts with exploitable vulnerabilities, and then copy themselves to
new hosts and activate themselves through the exploit. Worms started possessing
this capability with SDBot in 2002.
The second category of worms require some type of user-intervention to help them
spread. A common ploy is to send out fake emails to try to get an unsuspecting user
to download and execute a program from a website or open a malicious attachment.
Some worms use the web to spread by exploiting browser vulnerabilities. Rather than
seeking out vulnerable machines, the attacker lets the vulnerable machines come
to him. This approach may be slower, but it really depends on the number and
popularity of the websites used for propagation. MPack [40] is an example of a tool
used to accomplish this. By using an iframe attack [50], legitimate websites can be
used for malware propagation. Because the websites themselves are inadvertently
9spreading malware, worms propagated in this fashion are being referred to as trojans.
b. Trojans
Trojans only propagate by social engineering. While email can be used to spread
trojans, they are principally found on false websites; email (spam) may be used to
draw attention to the sites. A common method for spreading Trojans is to place
them on game or pornography websites. Sometimes these sites are set up solely for
the purpose of spreading malware.
2. Control Structure
The authors of [10] proposed three possible command and control (C&C) models for
botnets: centralized, decentralized, and random. During the course of this study, no
botnets that use a random control structure were found, and given the drawbacks of
such a system, it is unlikely that such a model will be developed in the near future
[10][69]. It is acknowledged that control structures and communication protocols are
very closely related; however in this work they will be discussed independently of each
other.
a. Centralized
Centralized botnets are those that utilize a single host to communicate with bot-
net clients. The majority of known botnets use a centralized control structure. In
April 2008, Arbor Networks posited that 95% of known botnets were centralized
[42]. Advantages for this approach include simplicity and maintainability. The major
disadvantage is that this creates a single point of failure in the system.
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b. Decentralized
The decentralized control structure is in itself a countermeasure. Peer-to-peer (P2P)
systems were first utilized when security expert and law enforcement officials began
actively targeting botnets and botmasters. In the decentralized model, there is no
central point of communication. Bot clients are responsible to send messages to
their peers, making the botnet more difficult to disable. The first P2P botnet to be
discovered was Sinit, in 2003 [60]. Phatbot, a direct descendant of Agobot, abandoned
the former’s C&C model for a P2P based one [61].
3. Protocol
The protocol is the standard that defines the syntax and structure of data in com-
munication between two hosts. This is significant to defenders because captured
data must be interpreted in order to be understood, and knowing the protocol is a
significant part of that.
a. IRC
IRC was the original botnet protocol, and though there are signs that malware writers
are exploring other protocols, the majority of botnets currently in operation still use
IRC. The IRC protocol is tied to the centralized C&C model, this has been the main
motivator for botmasters to seek alternatives. Other disadvantage is the fact that
IRC traffic is not common for many networks and thus is easy for administrators to
pinpoint and block.
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b. Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
The HTTP protocol [19] is also tied to the centralized C&C model, but it has one
important advantage over IRC: the majority of internet traffic on networks is HTTP,
which makes it much more difficult for administrators to isolate malicious traffic.
c. P2P
While it has been suggested that P2P development is increasing [25], Arbor Networks
estimated that at present P2P botnets only comprise 5% of the current botnet pop-
ulation [42]. The reality is that there is insufficient data on botnets currently in the
wild to make an accurate determination. What is known is that several P2P botnets
have been discovered in the past five years, including Phatbot [61][57], Nugache [44],
SpamThru [62] and Peacomm [25].
4. Features
Before bots became modularized, most bots possessed a comprehensive command
list encompassing all of the features discussed in this section. Now bots are being
designed to be more specialized, a family of bots typically exists to serve a certain
function and possesses a commensurate command list. One feature common to all
the following functions is the ability to report results back to the botmaster after
successful or unsuccessful execution of commands.
a. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
The DDoS attack demonstrates the malicious power of a botnet by crippling an
organization’s web services by consuming their bandwidth on bogus requests. As
of yet there is no solid defense against DDoS attacks. Any botnet whose aggregate
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bandwidth exceeds that of its target poses a decisive threat. The following attack
methods are most common:
• TCP SYN Flood [73]
• HTTP GET Flood [46]
• UDP Flood [35]
• ICMP Flood (Smurf Attack) [73]
b. Spam
One of the major obstacles in curtailing spam is that spamming has become one of
the main functions of botnets. Blacklisting has become ineffective because instead of
a handful of mail servers there are hundreds of thousands of zombified clients, and
the list of bots is always changing. If a botmaster commands a large botnet, he can
send out small amounts of spam from each client, thus avoiding creating an anomaly
that might be detected.
c. Server
Bots can be used to provide services to the botmaster and his clientele. A bot might
be set up as an HTTP server to serve web pages in a phishing scheme. Bots have also
been used as FTP servers to store illicit information (such as child pornography).
d. Proxy
Botnets run HTTP and SOCKS (Secured Over Credential-based Kerberos Services
[36]) proxies, providing anonymity to botmasters.
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e. Extortion
Two methods of botnet extortion exist. In the first, the botnet performs a DDoS
attack on an organization, then demands money from the organization in exchange
for a cessation of attacks. In the second, the bot client encrypts data on the host
machine. A message is then sent to the victim, demanding payment in exchange for
the key to unencrypt the data.
f. Data Collection
Any information that is determined to be of value can be retrieved by a bot client.
Some botnets utilize simple keylogger programs. These programs generate large
amounts of data which must be analyzed, thus botmasters have begun to target
specific data. The data itself becomes a commodity to botmasters, often selling off
data to third parties. Data collected includes credit card numbers, CD keys, digital
certificates, and authentication information for computers, email, Outlook, Paypal,
etc. Some data collection is tailored specifically for businesses. A variant of the Prg
botnet has been developed targeting the banking sector, allowing attackers to access
banking accounts without a username or password [28].
g. Self Preservation
One of the first items in a bot script is to disable anti-virus on the host machine
in order to avoid detection. Some systems simply turn off the anti-virus protection.
Others subvert it by tampering with the alerting system. It has become common for
botnets to patch vulnerabilities in the host system after infection so that the system
cannot be exploited by a rival botnet. Botnets also have the ability to receive updates
to the botnet software.
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h. Self Destruction
If a botmaster suspects a bot has been compromised, he can remotely shut down the
bot and erase all data pertaining to the bot.
15
CHAPTER III
THE HONEYPOT RESPONSE
The number of tools at a security administrator’s disposal in his defense against
botnets is not large. Honeypots have been recognized as being one of the most useful.
In his book Tracking Hackers, Lance Spitzner gives a comprehensive definition of
what a honeypot is: “A honeypot is a security resource whose value lies in being
probed, attacked or compromised.” [59]
A. Honeypot History
In 1988, an astronomer named Clifford Stoll published a paper entitled “Stalking
the Wily Hacker,” outlining his experience of tracing an intruder in the network he
managed at Lawrence Berkley Laboratory [64]. The following year, Stoll followed up
with a book called The Cuckoo’s Egg [65]. The method that Stoll used did not include
a honeypot; Stoll allowed the hacker to have an almost free run of the lab’s production
network. His reasons for doing this, namely to be able to track the hacker, captured
the interest of the sysadmin community and paved the way for the first honeypots to
be designed.
In 1992, An Evening with Berferd was released. This whitepaper was much closer
to the modern definition of a honeypot. In the whitepaper a system administrator
narrates his surreptitious interactions with a hacker. After the attacker falls into one
of the traps the administrator set up, the administrator built an environment and
crafted responses in real-time in order to study his behavior. There were other goals,
the chief of which was to gather enough information about the attacker to be able
to ascertain his identity, so that he could be apprehended by the proper authorities.
Also prominent was the ability to be able to alert other administrators to the intruder
16
and his practices.[8]
Despite the interest that these documents raised, more than half a decade passed
with no further development, at least development that was made known to the
public. The first widely available honeypot was the Deception Toolkit (DTK), which
was released in 1998 by computer virus expert Dr. Fred Cohen [9]. The toolkit
was a series of Perl scripts and code written in C. These scripts were designed to
run on a Unix system, and causes the system to appear to have a large number of
vulnerabilities. The concept here is that an attacker will be attracted to the system
running DTK through routine vulnerability scans, and will subsequently try to break
into the system. Because the vulnerabilities presented are manufactured, the attacker
will waste time and become frustrated. The toolkit also logs all communications made
with the pseudo-vulnerable ports, which allows the user to gain information on the
tactics and techniques of the attacker.
Several commercial products followed. CyberCop Sting was the first, produced
by Network Associates (now McAfee) in 1998. This product was notable for being
the first developed for Windows based system, as opposed to Unix. Around this time
Verizon, then known as GTE, developed its own honeypot system called NetFacade,
which was capable of simulating a class C network on a single host [71]. Also released
that year was BackOfficer Friendly, by NFR Security. It was designed to spoof as
a BackOrifice server [15], a known exploit at the time [27]. It ran originally on
Windows systems, but was also expanded to Unix systems. In the same vein as
DTK, BackOfficer Friendly was also freely available [66].
In 1999, the Honeynet Project was formed[72]. This was designed to be a col-
laboration between security professionals with the aim of sharing research with the
goal of combatting the growing malware problem. Established procedures were pub-
lished in a series of papers called “Know Your Enemy.” The term Honeynet is used
17
to denote a network of honeypots. The Honeynet project also made its tools freely
available. With this collaboration in place, researchers and administrators began
deploying honeypots in larger numbers and collecting data. In 2002, a honeypot
captured an exploit of the Unix Common Desktop Environment (CDE) Subprocess
Control Service (dtspcd), a network daemon that accepts requests from clients to
execute commands and launch applications remotely [7, 59]. The vulnerability was
known, but it was believed that this weakness was not being exploited; examination
of the honeypot showed this to be false. This was the first time that a honeypot was
known to discover an unknown exploit.
B. Honeypot Classification
Current publications classify honeypots as either production or research [59]. Pro-
duction honeypots are those used by organizations as a part of their security plan.
Research honeypots are used by universities and other research groups solely to learn
more about malware and the malware community. While this is a significant dis-
tinction, the differences appear to be in use only, not in actual function. During the
course of this research only one honeypot was found that was described specifically
as a production honeypot. Incidentally, a ’research’ version of this same honeypot
was also released, but the only significant differences between the two systems was
the amount of support provided and the price [43].
The amount of interaction a honeypot provides to the attacker is the only other
viable classifier. Again, previously published information, notably [59], identify three
classes of honeypot interaction: low, medium, and high; however, there is not a clear
distinction between low and medium. Low-interaction honeypots emulate services
and have “limited interaction capabilities;” medium-interaction honeypots also em-
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ulate services, but they are said to provide ’more interaction’ than low-interaction
honeypots. Because there is no clear method to define the difference between low and
medium, this paper disregards medium-interaction and refers to all honeypots that
emulate services as low.
With this change in place, a low-interaction honeypot is a honeypot which emu-
lates certain services, while a high-interaction honeypot provides a complete operating
environment. The latter is accomplished by either using an entire computer, or a vir-
tual machine.
Low-interaction honeypots are usually preconfigured programs that are easy to
deploy and monitor. The drawbacks to such systems is that since they are limited
in the interaction that they allow an attacker, their ability to collect data is also
limited. These honeypots are also more easily detected. Because services are merely
emulated, there is less of a chance that an attacker could use the honeypot to attack
other systems.
Because a high-interaction honeypot is a complete system, there are no prepack-
aged setups. Data detection and maintenance methods have to be created by the
maintainer, although there are some external tools that can aid with this. Most im-
portantly, the attacker will be able to use the honeypot to attack other systems unless
safeguards are put in place. Firewalls are usually erected to keep the honeypot from
sending out malicious traffic but this is a telltale sign to an attacker that the machine
is a honeypot, or at the least a system of limited value.
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CHAPTER IV
ANTI-HONEYPOT TECHNIQUES
Because of the success that defenders have had against the malware community with
honeypots, code has been developed to circumvent them. Deception is a key part
of a honeypot’s effectiveness; it has no value if an attacker knows which systems on
a network are honeypots. Most detection methods involve fingerprinting, finding a
distinct result in which a honeypot differs from its non-honeypot counterpart.
An early example of this is Honeypot Hunter [58], a tool developed by Send Safe
in 2002. The program determines whether a discovered mail relay is legitimate or a
honeypot by running its own mail server and sending a test message to itself via the
mail relay [33]. If the message fails, then the relay is bad; if the message fails but
server responds that the message was successfully sent, the relay is likely a honeypot.
A. VM Detection
Virtualization has become the platform of choice for deploying honeypots. Moreover,
virtual platforms are also used for malware analysis. For this reason, malware devel-
opers have developed routines that check specifically to see if code is being executed
in a virtual environment. Because of the efficiency and availability of VMware, it
specifically has become a target, although User Mode Linux (UML) has also been
used for virtual honeypots.
1. Branding
One of the most obvious ways to determine a virtual machine environment are the
virtual devices. A query of hardware information under VMware will show the model
of both CDROM and hard drives as VMware, clearly showing virtualization. Compare
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the two hardware listings:
Listing 1:
RealCPU:~# lshw
RealCPU
description: Portable Computer
product: Latitude D830
vendor: Dell Inc.
serial: B1234E6
...
*-display:0 UNCLAIMED
description: VGA compatible controller
product: Mobile GM965/GL960 Integrated Graphics Controller
vendor: Intel Corporation
...
*-cdrom
description: DVD writer
product: DVD+-RW TS-L632H
...
*-disk
description: ATA Disk
product: TOSHIBA MK3252GS
vendor: Toshiba
Listing 2:
VMCPU:~# lshw
VMCPU
description: Computer
product: VMware Virtual Platform
vendor: VMware, Inc.
version: None
serial: VMware-ff 4d b7 9a 2c 7c 9c 62-44 c8 bd f4 e9 f7 4f ff
...
*-cdrom
product: VMware Virtual IDE CDROM Drive
...
*-display
description: VGA compatible controller
product: [VMware SVGA II] PCI Display Adapter
vendor: VMware Inc
...
*-disk
description: SCSI Disk
product: Virtual disk
vendor: VMware
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2. System
More differences can be found by looking at low-level functions. One prominent
example is that of the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT). Virtual machines emulate the
table, but it is located in a higher location in memory in a virtual environment. This
discrepancy was found by legitimate researchers [31][54], but has also been utilized
and improved by the malware community [12].
3. Timing
Another characteristic of virtual machines is that instructions take longer to execute
on a virtual machine than a regular system, even though the additional time may be
imperceptible to a user. This is because there are additional instructions that take
place, either due to emulation because the actual instruction doesn’t exist in the vir-
tual environment, or because of the time that it takes to pass the instruction through
the virtualization layer. Several successful timing methods have been developed [16],
including one which counts individual instructions [55].
B. Sebek
Sebek [67] is a tool produced by the Honeynet Project. It has a client-server archi-
tecture. The client is located on the honeypot and functions as a kernel module,
detecting syscalls in order to capture keystrokes and other attacker session data. The
server, typically the Honeywall gateway, collects and stores the data. Transmissions
between client and server are done via UDP and are not easily detectable via packet
sniffers. However, the presence of the Sebek kernel module causes the memory loca-
tions of the sys read and sys write system calls to be much farther apart than they
normally would be, constituting a fingerprint [11].
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C. Outbound Connection Validation and Initiation
One of the most challenging issues in running a high-interaction honeypot is dealing
with outbound connections. Inbound connections are always allowed so that the
honeypot can be attacked, but allowing compromised honeypots to become a platform
for attacking other machines has ethical and possibly legal repercussions that are best
avoided. Defenders expect botnets to establish a connection with C&C servers, so
usually a small number of connections are allowed. Still, it is a simple matter for
a bot developer to program his bots to attempt to contact the outside world. One
hacker admonished his fellows to simply contact 20 prominent websites [11].
Along these same lines, an attacker could create an initiation procedure for the
botnet, not allowing a new bot to join the botnet until it completed a certain task,
presumably one that required an outbound connection. The attacker could set up
multiple authorization servers that each passed on part of a key to the bot client,
which would be required by the C&C server for authentication. This method would
require the botmaster to maintain multiple servers, possibly employing redundancy,
or risk having the botnet initiation process fail and limit the size of the botnet as a
result.
Attackers are also aware of the use of Snort inline on outbound connections to
render malicious commands benign[11]. A presumable response could be to initiate a
bot by requiring it to infect another host. The secondary host would then report the
infection to the C&C server which would pass on an authorization key, which would
then be passed back to the original infected bot. A very similar process is outlined
in [74].
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CHAPTER V
REQUIREMENTS AND ARCHITECTURE
Many of the building blocks necessary to deal with these botnet threats already exist.
Most of them are part of a current honeypot solution, some concepts are taken from
other security systems. At present, none of them exist altogether in one framework.
A. Requirements
1. Modular and Upgradable
Taking a page from the botnet developer’s handbook, a honeynet should be as mod-
ular and easy to upgrade as Agobot and all its children. In a manner of speaking,
many botnet components are modular. The Honeynet Project has developed a large
number of tools that work together. Because these tools are open-source, they are
an excellent foundation from which to start to build a customized honeypot solution.
This compatibility must be maintained.
2. Utilizes Virtualization
Despite the challenges posed by virtual machine detection, the benefits of virtualiza-
tion are too great to be ignored. Virtualization allows multiple honeypots to be run
on the same system; a server with a quad-core 2.5 MHz processor and 8 GB of mem-
ory could run up to twenty honeypots. These systems can all be powered on and off,
erased and reimaged by remote control. Another valid question is whether the trend
towards honeypots self-destructing in virtual machine environments will continue, as
there are non-honeypot virtual machine servers that are high-value targets for bot-
masters. Commercial visualization is not marketed primarily towards researchers, but
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businesses who are looking to make their IT expenditures more efficient. It would
seem that it would be counterproductive for a botmaster to ignore these potential
resources.
3. Accept Input From External Networks
The botnet needs to be modular/flexible enough to deal with inbound traffic from
multiple networks. This means that the honeynet’s address space needs to be in-
dependent of any external addresses. It should be capable of receiving traffic from
individual Internet Protocol (IP) addresses scattered throughout subnet or a block
of address space. It should also accommodate addresses from different networks,
such as traffic redirected from a virtual private network (VPN) [23], generic routing
encapsulation (GRE) [17], or internet telescopes [5][41][47].
4. Does Not Allow External Attacks
Despite the fact that this requirement is present in all viable honeypots, it is nontriv-
ial. A honeypot that allows too few connections will be ineffective; one that allows
too many could inadvertently cause those seeking to catch lawbreakers to become
lawbreakers.
5. Automated Analysis and Infiltration
The system should be able to perform simple analysis without human intervention.
It should also be able to extract a network fingerprint and other artifacts from the
botnet binary, allowing a clean client to join the botnet and gain intelligence without
the danger that the botnet client itself would pose, namely infecting other systems.
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6. Allows Secondary Infections
Honeypots should be allowed to infect each other. This allows any initiation require-
ment to be fulfilled.
7. Masks Branding
References to virtual hardware should be concealed or changed.
8. Only Capture Unique Malware
Agreeing with the reasoning of [52], the stated goal of malware collection is to collect
as many bot binaries as possible. However, receiving the same binaries over and over
again is not desired. Unfortunately, this is a highly probable occurrence during the
outbreak of a new worm–victims are assimilated at a high rate, and each new victim is
performing its own scans for vulnerable hosts. Therefore, an amendment is in order:
the stated goal of malware collection is to collect as many unique bot binaries as
possible.
9. Virtualization Failsafe
Because virtual machine detection is a big part of anti-honeypot techniques, some
botnets might avoid collection despite best efforts. The honeynet should be able to
compensate for this.
10. Automated Centralized Malware and Data Collection
Even in a moderately sized honeynet, there will be much data to be collected. Network
statistics and malware are arguably most important. The honeynet should have the
ability to capture data from multiple sources and store it in an organized fashion.
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B. Architecture
Fig. 1. Honeynet Architecture
The architecture for the honeynet is shown in Figure 1. It consists of three main
sections: collection, testing, and control.
1. Collection
The collection section is the heart of the honeynet. It contains three different types of
honeypots: VM high-interaction, low-interaction, and non-VM high-interaction. The
variance in platform provides a way to capture binaries that have virtual machine
detection that has not yet been defeated. Because low-interaction honeypots require
less maintenance, they provide a collection platform that can be run continuously.
Nepenthes [4] is chosen for the low-interaction honeypot because of its ease of use
and its compatibility with other Honeynet Project tools. Because Microsoft Windows
is more frequently targeted by bots, Windows XP with service pack 2 is the operating
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system of choice for both the non-virtual honeypot and the majority of the virtual
honeypots. The remainder of the operating systems consist of an even split of Linux
Debian based and RPM based systems.
The virtual honeypots utilize an existing patch that changes the branding in
VMware to more common device and driver names [32]. Assuming that botnet code
would be looking for specific values (”VMware”), making simple changes should be
sufficient to thwart bot tests, where a flesh-and-blood attacker might not be so easily
fooled.
2. Testing
The testing environment is isolated on a separate virtual local area network (VLAN)
to avoid secondary infections from honeypots. A virtual machine with multiple guests,
designated as spies, is the principal system for testing. A fresh operating system image
can be loaded into the spy, along with a copy of the botnet binary. Two other systems
exist in the testing VLAN, one a victim that exists solely to be infected, and the other
plays the role of the command and control server. The server runs both an IRC and
a HTTP server in order to interact with the bot client. One assumption here is that
the botnet utilizes either the IRC or HTTP protocol. As the bot begins to make
contacts, traffic is redirected to either the server or the victim based on protocol.
If no meaningful communication is established, the controller will erase the test
machine and start over, remembering the previous traffic redirections and reversing
them. The goal here is two fold, to learn more about the infection process, including
any initiation procedures, and to learn how the bot interacts with the C&C server.
This is similar to the approach used in [52]; the difference is that their test environ-
ment does not include a victim host. The server will attempt to communicate with
the bot based on information stored in the database. If the bot self-destructs, the
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controller will reset the test machine and the server will try different responses until
its database is exhausted.
3. Control
The two prominent parts of the control section are the controller and the firewall. The
controller is responsible for managing the honeynet as a whole. The firewall controls
the flow of data both in and out of the honeynet.
The controller is responsible for data collection, one of the most important parts
of the honeynet. Because there are three different types of honeypots, multiple col-
lection methods are needed to automatically extract bot binaries from each different
type of system. Sebek is used for collection purposes on both virtualized and non-
virtualized honeypots. Because of Sebek detection however, one virtual honeypot
utilizes a different collection scheme.
In this case, the virtual machine is shut down at a specified interval. The virtual
machine image is then compared to a clean image, utilizing a whitelist to capture
common system log changes. The remaining files are collected for testing. With the
low interaction honeypots, a simple script captures malware at scheduled intervals.
Finally, data is also collected from the firewall. All data is routed to the database,
running MySQL.
The controller is also responsible for the general maintenance of all systems.
Both virtual and non-virtual machines are rebooted at timed intervals and are reim-
aged with clean copies of their operating systems. With non-virtual systems this
is accomplished with the use of an administrative operating system on a separate
partition.
The firewall performs several tasks, most of which deal with filtering and blocking
traffic. The firewall also redirects all domain name server (DNS) traffic to the internal
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DNS. It is the firewall that produces the efficiency of the honeynet.
In [52], the uniqueness question was dealt with by disabling the download capac-
ity of the low-interaction honeypot Nepenthes, and using an independent download
station. The experiment also included virtual high-interaction honeypots, although
Nepenthes was the primary malware collection platform. Unfortunately, the issues of
reoccurring downloads in the virtual honeypots was never addressed.
The honeyfarm GQ [13] deals with this problem by utilizing two different types
of filtering. The first filter blocks packets that can positively be identified as having
been seen before by the first packet. The second involved using a replay proxy [14]
to continue communication with inbound traffic where more packets are needed to
determine whether the traffic is new. Unique traffic is then played back to a honeypot
and the session is transferred.
While GQ’s solution is novel, it is much more than what is required for a honeynet
designed to handle a class C network. However, a simplification of the idea would be
productive, monitoring incoming traffic to a honeypot and resetting the connection
if it can be determined that the attack has already been stored. While the idea
of dropping traffic is hardly novel, traditionally in honeynets the inbound traffic is
unhindered to allow the greatest amount of infection, while constraints are placed on
outbound packets.
The firewall also applies constraints to outbound traffic, but the principal means
of contraint is not connection counting like Honeywall. Snort inline is the principal
means of constraining traffic, converting known malicious traffic to non-malicious.
The firewall does utilize its own form of connection counting: if the firewall counts
the number of outbound connections per minute exceeding a certain threshold, the
number of connections will be throttled.
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CHAPTER VI
PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed implementation of the work takes place in four phases. The phased
implementation is designed to allow incremental testing. In the first phase, the hon-
eynets are deployed with a preconfigured controller and firewall. The customized
controller is developed in the second phase. Phase three adds the the testing plat-
form. In phase four, the system is modified to accept noncontiguous and external
network connections. A proof of concept was completed that contains a proof of
concept that contains partial elements of the first and second phases. See Appendix
A.
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CHAPTER VII
FUTURE WORK
At the time of writing, phase one has been implemented but not tested. The next
step is to test phase one and continue through with development and test through
the proposed implementation. There are also two additional tools that currently have
not been evaluated but their descriptions look promising. The first is CWSandbox.
This is a commercial tool that creates a simulated malware analysis environment.
The second is botsnoopd, a daemon that spies on botnets. The tool utilizes IRC,
HTTP, and P2P via WASTE. Note that this tool is not publicly available, but can
be obtained by those who have sufficient credentials in the security community.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
In order for a honeynet to be able to retain efficiency and deal with modern anti-
honeypot techniques, it must utilize virtualization. Therefore, it must be able to
defeat virtual machine detection. In order to deal with all contingencies, it should
have a non-virtual honeypot within the network. Sebek is not a must for collection
management, but if it is used, steps must be taken to ensure that it is not detected.
Outbound connections must be flexible enough to allow connection to C&C servers
and fulfill any simple connection verification tests while still disallowing external
attacks.
An efficient-botnet centric honeynet solution is certainly attainable. Unfortu-
nately, attackers and defenders are caught up in a continually escalating arms race,
which means that any viable solution is only effective for a short period before means
are found to overcome it. One of the works referenced in this paper is a fake issue
of Phrack magazine, which contained not only hacking, but some pontificating [11],
claiming that the Honeynet Project was built upon flawed premises:
1. HoneyPot Technology may be openly shared and remain effective.
2. HoneyPot Technology may be deployed in a hostile environment, and remain
undetected.
3. Even if detected, Attackers will not target the honeypot or its operators for
further exploitation.
While it is na¨ive to think that security professionals are unaware of these issues
or are unprepared to deal with them, the first one specifically seems to be a significant
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disadvantage. In many works, including this one, there is much speculation about
what the malware community is doing because the malware community does not
widely disseminate its doings. And then, because of the lack of information, research
create their own scenarios about what hackers may be doing, and in the process,
provide them with additional resources. This is a non-trivial problem, but it reminds
me of why the government has different security clearances and some government
information is classified. Sometimes the public does not need to know.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF CONCEPT
The experiment was executed in order to validate the viability of the design.
There are two main contributions to honeynets in this design. The first is in terms
of efficiency, and the second in productivity. Specifically, the experiment was de-
signed to show that honeynets can be more efficient by being selective in allowing
incoming traffic. Allowing all incoming traffic produces redundancy and is therefore
inefficient. It is also designed to show that virtualization failsafes are a necessary part
of honeynets today.
The test consisted on creating a closed network in which a ’victim’ machne was
subjected to various forms of malware as shown in Figure 2. The victim machine
was connected to two separate honeynets, one using ’standard’ configuration, and
one with enhancements based on the proposed design. Data was collected from the
honeynet, upon which conclusions were based.
Fig. 2. Test Network Layout
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The latest version of Honeywall [68] from the Honeynet Project was used as
the ’standard’ honeynet controller. Honeywall utilizes Snort inline with a standard
set of rules designed to restrict outbound traffic. It also includes a Sebek server for
collecting malware into a MySQL database. By contrast, the customized controller
also uses Snort inline, but emphasis was placed on inbound traffic. For simplicity’s
sake, outbound traffic filters were omitted.
The custom controller was designed to automatically generate rules based on
incoming network traffic, so that a honeynet would only be infected with the same
malware once. The initial plan was to use Honeycomb [34], a tool specially designed
to create Snort and Bro signatures. Unfortunately, Honeycomb requires exposure to
network traffic in order to train itself, which posed a problem. This issue was solved
by the creation of a far simpler signature generation tool, makesig. The tool uses a
libpcap trace to generate signatures for self-propagating malware that copies itself
to the host using FTP or TFTP. Packet data is extracted based on port data along
with packet sizes, which was based on previous observations. Using a timed interval,
makesig checks the trace file for packets that meet the pattern, and if the pattern is
matched, new rules are created, the trace file is flushed, and Snort inline is restarted
(See Figure 3).
The standard honeynet uses two virtual high-interaction honeypots. The custom
honeynet has both a virtual and a non-virtual high-interaction honeypot. VMWare
ESI Server 3i 3.5.0 was the virtualization platform used. All honeypots were running
Microsoft Windows SP 2. The malware was obtained from Offensive Computing [2].
Each honeynet was run on a separate IBM eServer xSeries 335, each with two
Intel Xeon 2.4 GHz processor, 2 GB of memory and two 73.4 GB hard drives. The
victim machine and the non-virtual honeypot were both Dell Optiplexes GX240 with
a Intel Pentium 4 1.6 GHz processor, 256 MB of memory and 20 GB of storage space.
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Fig. 3. Expanded Controller View
A Dell Powerconnect 2708 switch was used to connect all machines, utilizing multiple
VLANs to provide traffic separation.
During the course of the experiment it was observed that it took a long time
for self-propagating malware to actually infect the honeypots because they scanned
randomly for IP addresses within the Class A and Class B address space, rather than
starting with their local subnet. To speed up the process, a reverse NAT module
was added to each honeynet. The module was a short program written in C++
that ingored initial packets based on a specified count, then captured two packets
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and mapped them to the two internal honeypots, and forwarded them through the
controller. All subsequent packets were dropped. Resetting the reverse NAT module
also allowed the honeypots to be allowed to be infected multiple times. Each NAT
module was reset once, allowing the machine to be potentially infected with each
virus twice.
Twelve different malware samples were tested. Of the twelve, one signature was
generated, successfully preventing that honeynet from being infected with that mal-
ware again. Surprisingly, four of the samples would not run in a virtual environment.
In addition, there was no observed behavior at all on three of the samples in the test.
These are marked as N/A in Table II.
Table II. Number of Honeynet Infections
Standard Custom
Honeypot 1 Honeypot 2 Honeypot 1 Honeypot 2
1 2 2 1 1
2 N/A N/A N/A N/A
3 N/A N/A N/A N/A
4 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 2
6 N/A N/A N/A N/A
7 2 2 2 2
8 0 0 0 2
9 0 0 0 0
10 2 2 2 2
11 0 0 0 2
12 0 0 0 2
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The results show a significant difference between the standard honeypot and
the custom one. Ideally, a honeynet should capture each malware sample one time.
Multiple collections is inefficient, and a failure to capture is unproductive. Based on
the results, efficiency and productivity are calculated using the equations below:
efficiency =
number of unique collections
number of total collections
(A.1)
productivity =
number of unique infections
number of unique collections
(A.2)
Table III. Honeypot Productivity and Efficiency
Honeynet Productivity Efficiency
Standard 25% 33%
Custom 39% 78%
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